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Abstract: 
From the early 1960s onwards London has managed to vie with New York for the top spot as 
an international financial centre. Ever since then, London has reigned as a leading global 
financial hub, despite not having behind it anything like the political or economic backing 
enjoyed by New York. This paper seeks to explain this phenomenon by building on 
Kindleberger’s classic analysis of financial centres as international hubs that arise due to 
economic, geographic and infrastructural advantages, and more recent theories of specialised 
financial centres that suggest that financial centres deploy discriminatory business practices 
in order to compete with the scale economy-based centres. Our central claim here is that 
London’s continuing financial supremacy can be traced to the way that the opposing 
‘economic’ and ‘political’ sets of criteria necessary for a financial centre are here inextricably 
fused together in a mutually reinforcing dynamic. Three case studies are used to support this 
claim. 
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Introduction  
 
Historically, the financial centre of London evolved as a typical Marshallian district serving 
the sprawling British Empire (Davis & Huttenback, 1986; Kynaston, 2011).  As the British 
Empire and the British economy’s status as a major industrial power declined during the 
course of the 20
th
 century, it was only to be expected that there would be a corresponding 
decline in the City of London’s position as a leading international financial centre (IFC). This 
expectation was indeed temporarily met in the periods immediately preceding and succeeding 
WWII when the US emerged as the capitalist world’s economic superpower and New York 
took over London’s mantle as the world’s foremost financial centre. However, from the early 
1960s onwards London has managed to vie with New York for the top financial spot, despite 
not being endowed with political, diplomatic or economic backing supports enjoyed by the 
latter. In fact, as Z/yen, a commercial think-tank closely associated with the corporation of 
London, notes in a recent report, ‘London has moved ahead of New York to reclaim the 
number one position’ (Yeandle 2015: 4). 
 What lies behind this sustained premiership? Is it the collective effort of the City of 
London financiers, keen to preserve their power and status? The efforts of the British state? 
Or perhaps a unique combination of historical and geographical circumstances? The literature 
on financial centres offers two contrasting theories. One theory points to a combination of 
factors that span socio-economic, political, legal and geographical factors. In this 
interpretation, spurred by the deregulatory reforms of the 1986 ‘Big Bang’, London was able 
to cash in on its stable political and business environment, reliable regulatory framework, 
English common law, and favourable geographical position including a central time zone and 
concentration of human talent (Yeandle, 2015; Yeandle, et al., 2005).   
 An alternative theory suggests, in contrast, that London is the world’s premier 
‘onshore- offshore’ centre, whose revival dates back to the emergence of unregulated 
financial markets in 1957, known as the Euromarkets (Burn, 2005; Altman 1969; Hanzawa 
1991). Within a short space of time, British jurisdictions such as the Channel Islands, 
Caymans and Bermuda, as well as former colonies including Hong Kong, Singapore, Cyprus 
and Dubai, have evolved into ancillary offshore financial centres (OFCs) with close links to 
the London money markets. London’s success since then has been due largely to its highly 
permissive regulatory environment and the established links with the network of former 
colonies turned financial havens (Palan 2010; Palan 2016).  
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These two streams of academic arguments have largely evolved in contraposition to 
one another. It is typically believed that IFCs develop either at the heart of large and 
sprawling manufacturing and commercial centres (such as New York, Tokyo, Shanghai, 
Hong Kong, Paris and Frankfurt, known colloquially as ‘onshore’ financial centres), or 
alternatively, as a result of context-based discriminatory practices which may explain the rise 
of OFCs such as Zurich, Cayman Islands or Bermuda.  
In this article we inquire to what extent the two theoretical positions can be 
reconciled. Our key premise is that London’s dominant position in the global financial system 
is an anomaly. Unlike any other contender, the City of London has been able to fuse together, 
in a mutually reinforcing dynamic, two distinct sets of criteria for an IFC. On the one hand, 
capitalising on its historical position at the heart of the British Empire, London developed a 
wide range of scale economies and market efficiencies. On the other hand, London is able to 
serve as a unique offshore financial hub due to a series of discriminatory regulatory practices 
that are tailor-made for specific segments of finance. The case of London suggests that when 
a large and sprawling traditional financial centre is further supported by the institutions and 
practices of offshore financial centres, it builds into a globally spanning financial hub that 
uniquely benefits from scale economies, political stability and skills agglomeration, as well as 
from a highly benign regulatory and fiscal environment. No other leading financial centre can 
lay claim to having been able to satisfy all of these requisite criteria to the same degree.  
The paper presents three case studies to substantiate the argument: (a) those pertaining 
to the market for international loans and deposits; (b) the forex (FX) and over the counter 
(OTC) derivatives markets; and (c) the area of asset and collateral management. Each of 
these cases suggests that the competitive lead of London in modern finance is based on scale 
economies, established institutional links with other financial hubs as well as human skills, 
combined with discriminatory practices and regulatory or fiscal advantages. Together, these 
three areas establish a competitive lead in terms of market depth, liquidity and scale 
economics of financial innovation, making the City of London a unique ecosystem in global 
finance.   
 
The Growth of Financial Centres 
Early theories of financial centres have tended to associate their rise with the dynamics of the 
underlying economy and the specifics of geographical location (e.g. Christaller 1966). In this 
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framework, the growth of a financial centre was constrained by geographical conditions and 
predetermined by the success of the manufacturing or services, which ultimately left little 
room for political action in guiding the development of a financial centre.  Charles 
Kindleberger’s (1973, 1974) seminal study of the rise of world financial centres, while rooted 
in the economic rationale, would move academic understandings away from geographical 
reductionism, and towards a more nuanced reading of a financial centre that can thrive due to 
a combination of economic, logistical, infrastructural and other factors.  
 Kindleberger described the development and the geographical spread of IFCs as a 
variant of Marshallian district theory (Marshall 1990). He suggested that successful IFCs 
develop by balancing the benefits of market efficiencies and scale economies on the one 
hand, against geographical, informational and business practices (or context-based 
institutional assumptions), on the other. More specifically, Kindleberger considered economic 
(deep pool of available capital, economies of scale, headquarters of MNCs), infrastructural 
(central location, administrative capital, transport) and socio-political factors (history, 
tradition of banking and regulation, culture) as forces that can enable the agglomeration of 
capital and skills that would  endow a  city with the capital sufficient to be able to anchor a 
segment of the world financial system.  Despite being critical of the reductionism of the 
earlier writers, Kindleberger himself did not see governmental policy as a definitive force in 
the development of an IFC:   
 “Governmental policy can accelerate the emergence of a given city as the primary 
 financial center, it can slow the process down, but it can probably not change the 
 outcome. Too strongly pressing centralization will create resistance, and strong efforts 
 for decentralization can be overcome by private forces” (Kindleberger 1973: 93).  
 
Interestingly, writing amidst the currency turbulence of the early 1970s and analysing the 
early steps towards European financial integration, Kindleberger believed that it was 
Brussles, rather Zurich, Frankfurt or Paris, was the leading candidate for the mantle of the 
financial centre of the fledgling European Economic Community.
1
  
                                                          
1
 Kindleberger’s analysis of London’s prospects was more sceptical, although insightful as to the timing of a 
possible change: “Sterling is too weak, and British savings too little available to advance London's claim for 
consideration. The advantages of centralization are less compelling than they were in the middle of the 19th 
century. They still exist. Despite cultural resistance, and only with difficulty, I predict centralization will take 
place, but not before the late 1980s” (Kindleberger 1973: 93-94). 
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Kindleberger published his study just as the Eurodollar market was sprouting out of 
London and assuming an increasingly central role in the architecture of global finance. Yet it 
would take some time for the phenomenon of OFCs to become widely known. The impetus 
would come from the publication of new statistical data on international banking activities by 
the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) in 1982. This data alerted observers to the 
importance of offshore financial centres, in particular the Cayman Islands, as serious 
contenders to the traditional financial centres. Table 1 presents BIS locational statistics as of 
March 2006. In addition to the apparently unassailable position of London, the table shows 
the strength of the Cayman Islands (ranked fifth in 2006), as well as other OFCs, including 
Jersey, Guernsey, Bermuda and the Bahamas.  
 Modern theories of international financial centres descend from Kindleberger’s 
seminal study. The mainstream economics literature has tended to dismiss the rising OFCs as 
mere artefacts of tax and regulatory discriminatory practices largely by virtue of analysing 
this phenomenon through a functional lens. Y.S. Park, for example, has argued that OFCs 
developed not in competition with the scale economy-based financial centres, but in 
conjunction with them. ‘It would be cost inefficient’, he maintained, ‘to establish an elaborate 
infrastructure of international finance in each country to service just one national market. By 
locating most international banking and financial infrastructure in one central place, banks 
can spread their overhead costs in servicing clients in various countries’ (Park 1982: 32). This 
geographical concentration of infrastructure, he went on to argue, helped to promote a 
division of labour among international financial centres: thus ‘primary centres’ such as 
London and New York are fully functioning capital markets centres; ‘booking centres’ such 
as the Bahamas or the Cayman Islands are specialist ‘registration havens’ for Euromarkets 
transactions; other OFCs such as Singapore or Panama developed as ‘funding centres’ into 
which Euromarkets funds tend to be channelled; other OFCs again (e.g. Bahrain) are 
‘collection centres’ that are engaged primarily in channelling regional funds into the 
Euromarkets.
1
 The trend towards OFC specialisation was subsequently supported by research 
at the Bank of England. Dixon (Dixon, 2001) confirmed Park’s assessment by demonstrating 
that ‘financial intermediation undertaken by entities based in any OFCs is almost entirely 
‘entrepot’ (Dixon, 2001, p.105; Goodfriend 1988). Similarly, a BIS study acknowledged the 
increasingly cooperative nature of modern international finance by noting that the large IFCs 
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serve as global hubs for financial activities, linked as it were, to the secondary centres (Goetz 
2007).   
An alternative explanation for the division of labour among financial centres is 
presented by Gehrig (2000). ‘Trade in informationally sensitive securities’, he argues, ‘is 
likely to be geographically concentrated at those locations where information about those 
securities is aggregated and communicated. In contrast, trade in standardized securities is 
more likely to be footloose, reacting more sensitively to (regulatory) cost differentials’ 
(Gehrig 2000: 417-8).  In other words, Gehrig believes that financial centres are 
differentiated not only along functional lines outlined by Park  but also according to the 
nature of the financial assets. Thus innovative and highly complex products tend to be traded 
in scale economy-based financial centres due to the advantages conferred by skills 
agglomeration and liquidity, leaving the more standardized products to be traded in the 
OFCs. However, it not clear from the data whether trade in standardized instruments is 
deserting the primary financial centres. FX swaps for example, as will be seen below, are 
highly standardised FX transactions and yet continue to be channelled through leading 
centres such as London. At the same time, some OFCs such as the Cayman Islands and Jersey 
are known to be important centres of trading in highly informationally sensitive securities and 
to have become important registration centres for the hedge fund industry.  
IFCs are not only an economic phenomenon but also an important pillar of the global 
financial architecture and geography (Cohen 1998; Germain 1997; Langley 2002). In contrast 
to economists, political scientists pay greater attention to the evolution and diversity of IFCs 
as illustrations of the complexity of the state/market relationship in an increasingly 
interconnected world. Some argue, for instance, that OFCs encourage a ‘race to the bottom’ 
in international financial regulation that creates a regulatory vacuum that has, in turn, 
contributed to the global financial meltdown of 2007-9. Others suggest that these financial 
nodes are symptomatic of the complexity of political processes in an interdependent world, 
and seek to explain the failure of the advanced industrialised countries to mount a serious 
challenge to these centres (at the very least until recently, although the jury is out) by the 
existence of powerful political and economic interests (e.g. Clarke and O’Connor 1997).  
Such theories are predicated on the assumption that financial actors gravitate towards 
locations that offer substantial cost reductions through the beneficial effects of positive 
externalities. Since those externalities include regulation and taxation, successful centres are 
7 
 
those whose governments have introduced the requisite policies in these areas (Dharmapala 
& Hines, 2006; Baldacchino, 2006; Hampton, 1996).  
Today, most political economists would probably agree that the success of a emergent 
financial centre depends on its ability to facilitate capital funding, trade and risk management 
beyond the borders of a given nation-state. Saskia Sassen (1999) for instance, has identified 
two sets of factors that can help an ordinary city become a world financial centre: national 
consolidation, including agglomeration of capital and infrastructure, and market 
liberalisation.  At the same time, commenting specifically on London’s prospects in the 
emergent Eurozone, Sassen predicted that the City of London will thrive as a European and 
global financial centre on par with New York, because ‘London's competitive advantage lies 
in its ‘unique denationalized platform for global operations… One important factor is its 
flexible regulation policy, which basically leaves wholesale financial traders alone and 
concentrates only on retail finance to protect consumers” (Sassen 1999, emphasis added).  
The evolution of the global financial system during the past 20-25 years would prove 
such an insight was correct. Even in the face of new competition from emerging regional 
financial hubs in Dubai, Singapore, Hong Kong and other havens, London has strengthened 
its role as a global financial centre.  At the same time, the emphasis of many mainstream 
accounts of this continued leadership of London as IFC on scale efficiencies and flexible or 
accommodating regulatory policy tends to occlude the role of a more proactive 
discriminatory niche strategies that make London a unique ‘inshore offshore’ centre for 
capital. Below we unpack this argument, focusing on three specific areas of global financial 
activity.   
 
Re-emergence of London as a global financial centre 
In his book, the Re-Emergence of Global Finance, Gary Burn (Burn, 2005) argues that the 
decline of London was arrested due to the emergence of wholesale loan market in 1957 
known as the Euromarket ironically, for reasons that were directly linked to the collapsing 
British empire.  Faced with mounting speculations against the pound after the Suez Canal 
fiasco of 1956, the British government imposed strict restrictions on the use of sterling in 
trade credits with non-residents. Many City banks, primarily long-standing commercial banks 
that have established themselves as specialists in international lending (particularly to British 
Imperial outposts and the so-called British informal empire in Latin America) saw their core 
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business disappear overnight. They responded to the new restrictions by using US dollars in 
their international operations, explaining to a receptive Bank of England that such 
transactions have no bearing on UK balance of payment issues. At this point in history, the 
precise policy and legal steps that enabled and gave impetus to the Euromarkets become 
somewhat vague. It appears that (without any consultation with the British Treasury) the 
Bank of England had decided that it would not intervene in transactions that were undertaken 
between non-residents and that involved a foreign currency. The currency concerned at the 
time was the dollar, but other foreign currencies were subsequently included under this 
category. Congruent with English common law, the Bank classified certain types of financial 
transactions undertaken between non-resident parties and in foreign currencies as non-UK 
transactions. However, as these transactions were in actual fact taking place in London, and 
as they could not be regulated by any other regulatory authority, they effectively ended up in 
a regulatory black hole. This black hole, soon to be joined by others and  to be known soon  
as the offshore financial markets or Euromarkets, was the most important enabling factor 
behind the rise of London as a global financial centre in the 20
th
 century (Burn 2005). 
The Euromarkets initially occupied a peripheral position in the global financial 
system. Then - in what turned out to be a crucial tipping point in 1963 - the Kennedy 
administration in the US proposed a tax to counter the flow of funds to the Euromarket, a 
policy measure that achieved the exact opposite result of what was intended. The measure in 
question was the Interest Equalization Tax, a 15% tax on interest received from investments 
in foreign bonds, which was intended to make investment in such bonds unattractive to U.S. 
individuals or institutions. What in fact happened was that US corporations avoided paying 
the interest equalization tax by refusing to repatriate funds, thereby fuelling the growth of the 
London Euromarkets. Thus while the unregulated international lending market emerged 
somewhat haphazardly, it gradually expanded to embrace the bond market and by 1963 
gained support of the British state (Sylla 2002).   
The emergence of the Euromarket phenomenon alerted scholars to the fact that the 
importance of discriminatory practices to the development of financial centres ranked 
alongside the importance of traditional scale economy and agglomeration advantages. On the 
basis of these forces, London financial houses were able to reduce a crucial fixed cost 
dimension of trading in incorporeal assets, namely, the regulatory dimension. In effect, 
London seized the initiative in the development of the wholesale international financial 
markets, an initiative to which other centres had to respond as evidenced by subsequent 
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developments. Contrary to popular perception, the US Treasury initially objected to the rise 
of the unregulated market in London and put forward proposals for a new regulatory 
framework (Kapstein 1994).  When these proposals came to nothing, the US Treasury ( with 
the active encouragement of the New York banking community led by Citibank and Chase 
Manhattan) came to the conclusion that rather than resist the emergence of an unregulated 
global financial market, the US stood to gain by encouraging a domestic offshoot of this 
offshore market. Clear manifestation of the swift volt-face that took place was the 
establishment on 3
rd
 of December 1981 of the New York offshore market, the New York 
International Banking Facilities (IBF), a local, albeit more restricted, variant of the London 
offshore market. Just as the US IBF was set up as a defensive measure on the part of U.S. 
government regulators seeking to ‘internalize’ the Euromarkets into the U.S. banking system, 
so also was this true of Japan that followed suit in 1986 by establishing its own IBF, the 
Japanese Offshore Market (JOM) (Moffett and Stonehill 1989; Hanzawa 1991). 
By the 1970s, it had become clear that the success of London as a major financial 
capital was built on central two pillars: an historical concentration of professional and 
technical know-how in international finance on the one side, and the rise of the unregulated 
Euromarkets on the other. This said, London had some disadvantages. First and foremost of 
these was the fact that while London’s financial market was largely unregulated or ‘offshore’, 
British banks, which were among the core institutions of this market, were still subject to 
corporate taxation. Second, while British banks could not pose as non-residents for taxation 
purposes, American and other foreign banks could benefit from transfer pricing to ensure low 
taxation thus giving them an important competitive advantage over their British counterparts. 
Third, as London’s offshore market grew in size and complexity, the cost of conducting 
business in London became an additional vexing issue.  
These conditions heralded in turn the next pivotal step in the global ascent of London 
as a financial hub. As the City transformed itself into a large and flourishing OFC, or a 
conduit through which bankers, increasingly of American, Japanese and German origins, 
have learned to register financial transactions to avoid various regulations, the idea of using 
other, closely related jurisdictions sharing British law and regulations but having the added 
advantage of low taxation, seemed logical. In expanding operations internationally, London 
institutions appear to have sought the path of least resistance, selecting British imperial 
polities that broadly resembled the City of London’s unique political structure. As a result, 
the Euromarkets never developed in the larger British imperial possessions or dominions such 
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as Canada, India, or Australia, but in typically quasi-feudal polities such as the Channel 
Islands, and other small British dependencies. This resulted in a network of British—
dominated financial centres with close links between them.  
In sum, if the City of London originally developed as a scale economy-based financial 
centre, it was the subsequent deployment of favourable discriminatory practices that helped it 
to consolidate its key position in the global wholesale financial market. Table 1 shows the 
enviable position achieved by the UK by 2006 in the original Euromarkets segment of the 
international market for loans and deposits. The position of many of the financial centres 
captured in this tables is understandable.  The figures for Germany, to take one example, 
show US$ 2,794 billion in claims and US$ 1,722.0 billion in liabilities, while the figures for 
Japan, to take another example,  shows US$1898 billion claims and US$ 681.4 liabilities. 
These figures are typical for large exporting nations. Meanwhile, the figures for the US 
shows US$ 2,305 in claims and US$ 2,819 in liabilities while for Australia they show US$ 
146.8 billion claims and US$ 380.1 billion in liabilities; in other words, figures that are 
typical of borrowing nations. In contrast to all of the above, the figures for the UK and British 
OFCs are better balanced, which suggest that these are largely conduit centres. Table 2 
presents an amalgamated position of the UK and its linked possessions including the Chanel 
Islands and the British Overseas territories. The ‘British state’, as this amalgamation may be 
called, accounts for about 30% of the market for loans and deposits. If we include recently 
independent colonial possessions like Singapore and Honk Kong, the figure rises to 36%.  
It is also interesting to observe the growth of this market from 2006 to 2015 (tables 3 
& 4). A comparison of Tables 1 with 3, and 2 with 4 reveals three developments. The first is 
that the financial crisis of 2007-8 seems to have given impetus to a more intensive battle 
against tax abuse. While the G20 London Summit in April 2009 heralded a new era of 
apparent political willingness on this issue, the initial reality was a continuation of the pre 
2008 regime as the focus was on the use of soft law i.e. the use of black lists of tax haven 
jurisdictions and the like. Nevertheless, the growing number of measures introduced against 
tax evasion and avoidance appeared to have rendered OFCs less attractive in this particular 
market segment. The second development, as was to be expected, was the rise of East Asia 
and emerging markets. The third development was, as can be seen from the tables, a marked 
corresponding shift of this market segment from OFC to onshore centers in Europe.  
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TABLES 1 & 2, 3 & 4 HERE 
There has been considerable discussion of the changing nature of global cross-border 
bank lending in the past few years. Cerutti  (Cerutti, et al., 2014) for example, document the 
changing composition of cross-border lending between syndicated and non-syndicated loans. 
(Avdjiev & Takats, 2014) analyse the decline of cross-border bank lending to emerging 
markets, while (Hills & Hoggarth, 2013) discuss prudential implication of the market. We 
could not find a corresponding discussion that explains the relative decline of London and its 
satellite OFCs in the past few years in this market. Our hypothesis is that the measures 
discussed above, taken in conjunction with the competition from New Yorks’  IBF and 
Tokyo’s JOM have eroded, but not eliminated, the discriminatory advantage of London and 
British controlled tax havens in this particular market segment of the international financial 
system. However, as we shall now demonstrate below, this negative trend has been 
counterbalanced by London’s strengthening of position in other market segments of the 
international financial system.  
 
London’s position in the global FX and OTC derivatives markets 
According to the most recent BIS triennial survey of the FX markets (BIS, 2016), daily 
foreign exchange turnover averaged $5.1 trillion, with the overwhelming majority of this 
turnover occurring in just five jurisdictions: the UK (37%), the US (19%), Singapore (7.9%), 
Hong Kong (6.7 %) and Japan (6.1%).  The dominance of the UK and the US in the FX 
markets can be traced partially to the speculative trading activities of the hedge funds that are 
based (or managed) in London and New York. Faced with the task of generating above 
average returns (for which they charge, in return, above average fees) for their clients 
(traditionally wealthy individuals but also now increasingly institutional investors) hedge 
funds rely heavily on speculative currency trading as one of the principal means of achieving 
these returns. It is estimated that hedge funds account for over 50% of spot currency trade in 
London and New York due to their use of sophisticated computer software and server 
proximity to exploit any exchange rate disturbances. As these disturbances are likely to be 
very small in the case of the most widely traded currencies (the US dollar, the euro, the UK 
pound, the yen and the Swiss franc between them account for over 92% of total daily FX 
turnover) given the depth and liquidity of the markets for these currencies, hedge funds trade 
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these same currencies many times over, up to fifty times a day, so as to make any substantial 
profits (BIS, 2011). 
As New York rivals London as a home to hedge funds and their automated, high 
frequency currency trading, there has to be a further significant reason why London’s share of 
daily global FX turnover is more than twice that of New York’s. That reason is chiefly to be 
found in the FX swap segment of the currency markets. FX swaps, which accounted for 47% 
of global daily FX trading volume in 2016, are transactions that combine spot and outright 
forward transactions between the same two counterparties and involving the same two 
currencies, e.g. the sale of an amount of dollars today for an agreed sum of euros is coupled 
with a commitment to repurchase the dollars with an agreed amount of euros at some point in 
the future. FX swaps serve two basic functions: on the one hand, they represent a cheap, 
collateralized form of borrowing a foreign currency; on the other hand, they represent an 
alternative type of repo (repurchasing agreements) in that institutions wanting to borrow cash 
in their own currency can use a foreign key currency such as the dollar rather than 
government bonds as collateral. Although FX swaps are now used in both functions in most 
areas of the world, it is in the Eurozone area where their use is heaviest as indicated by the 
unusually high ratio of inter-dealer FX swaps in the Eurozone: 67 per cent as compared with 
a rest-of-the-world average of 39 per cent (ECB, 2010). On the one hand, Eurozone 
commercial banks continue to hold substantial quantities of US dollar-denominated bonds 
and short term paper to boost yields and use FX swaps to manage their currency risk 
exposure, while on the other hand Eurozone banks’ dependence on the use of FX swaps as a 
substitute type of repo has increased following the Eurozone crisis due to the damage done to 
the financial position of many Eurozone governments. The irony is that although the UK is 
not in the Eurozone, by far the largest proportion of Eurozone FX swap transactions are 
conducted in London where the FX swap market is the deepest and most liquid and thus 
where the costs of executing these transactions is lowest.  
Considerations of costs and convenience also help to explain London’s large 
percentage share of the global over the counter (OTC) interest rate derivatives market, which 
stands at 48% according to the last BIS triennial survey. Derivatives are financial instruments 
that are used by a wide array of financial institutions to either hedge against, or alternatively 
speculate on, risk. While there are several other types of derivatives, including FX 
derivatives, credit swaps, and equity derivatives, interest rate derivatives are by far the most 
important (typically accounting for between 80 to 90% of the entire market), a fact that 
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largely ties in with the exigencies of institutional asset management. Although there are other 
users of interest rate derivatives, including non-financial corporations and governments and 
their agencies, it is insurance companies and pension funds that are, alongside the banks, the 
heaviest users of these products. This is because their long dated liabilities resulting from 
pension and annuity products have very large interest rate exposures that can prove costly in 
the face of even the smallest changes in interest rates, a problem which is compounded by the 
fact that on the asset side of their balance sheets insurance companies and pension funds 
typically hold securities that have a different return-risk profile to their liabilities. In order to 
reduce this mismatch, interest rate derivatives are used by insurance companies and pension 
funds to hedge their liabilities by providing them with products whose values move in the 
opposite direction of those associated with any interest rate changes.  
Although exchange traded derivatives are cheaper because they are bought and sold 
wholesale on a formal exchange (such as Chicago’s CME Group, the world’s largest 
exchange) their standardised nature renders them unsuitable for the particular needs of 
individual asset managers.  Over the counter (OTC) derivatives are more appropriate in this 
regard because they are off-exchange products that are negotiated and traded on a bilateral 
basis and thus can be tailored to fit customer’s needs. However, as end-users are unlikely to 
have exactly equal and opposite needs that can be matched easily, the large commercial banks 
play a crucial intermediary role in the OTC derivatives market in that they occupy the 
opposing sides of OTC trades. The risks undertaken by banks in these trades with clients are 
pooled together, with this aggregate risk pool then typically being hedged in the wholesale 
exchange traded derivative markets.  Now if we take into account that insurance companies 
are heavy users of interest rate swaps and that Europe has the largest share of the global 
insurance market (35%, as compared with 28% for the US) and add to these observations the 
fact that London has one of the largest concentration of commercial banks in the world, we 
can see why London is the foremost centre of the global OTC interest rate derivatives 
markets. It can be noted once again that although the UK is not in the Eurozone, by far the 
largest proportion of euro-denominated derivatives (an average daily value of $573 billion in 
2016, according to Intercontinental Exchange (ICE)) are cleared by London-based platforms.  
London’s predominant shares of Eurozone FX swap transactions and European OTC 
interest rate derivatives transactions has been a cause of envy if not also of concern amongst 
the political and financial elites in Frankfurt and Paris. However, the huge gulf separating 
London as the world’s premier IFC from Frankfurt and Paris as relatively minor continental 
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European financial centres is a direct reflection of the diametrically opposed approaches to 
financial regulation. As we mentioned above,  London has long been a major IFC because the 
two broad sets of factors required for any geographical location to become a viable financial 
centre – the ‘economic’ set (scale economies, skills clustering, etc.) and the ‘political’ set 
(light touch regulation, benign legal and tax environments etc.) – are  inextricably fused 
together in London in a mutually reinforcing dynamic: the benign political factors including 
discriminatory regulations attract large numbers of foreign financial institutions which give 
rise to scale economies, while the fact that the agglomeration of these institutions brings 
various benefits (e.g. employment benefits, knowledge externalities) to London facilitates the 
development of further discriminatory regulations and  niche policies.  By contrast, in 
Germany and France and other continental European countries the political and economic sets 
of criteria necessary for a viable financial sector have been locked together in a relation of 
mutual tension and conflict. The governing authorities in these countries – unlike their British 
counterparts – have tended historically to favour ‘industrial sector’ interests over the 
‘financial sector’ interests. The weight of history has been important here: to protect the 
interests of their domestic manufacturing corporations, Paris and Frankfurt sought tighter 
financial regulation to ensure that finance serves the real sector rather than the other way 
round; but this tighter regulation then acted as a deterrent to the clustering of financial 
institutions which then raised the costs of trading financial products.  It was these higher costs 
that in turn induced European financial institutions –and principally their banks and insurance 
companies – to divert their financial activities through London.  
The question that is inevitably raised by the above discussion is whether the situation 
will change following Britain’s narrowly contested decision to leave the European Union. At 
the time of writing, it is unclear as to how exactly Brexit will affect London’s position as a 
major centre for conducting transactions in euro-denominated financial instruments and 
services over the longer term. This in turn, may influence London’s position as the world’s 
leading IFC. The heart of the matter here comes down to the contest between regulatory 
issues on the one side and liquidity issues on the other. As noted, there is a desire amongst the 
European political and financial elites to move euro-linked financial business back to Paris 
and Frankfurt. The clearest example of this desire was the recent attempt by the European 
Central Bank to force the relocation of banks involved in the clearing and settlement of euro-
denominated transactions into the euro area. Although the ECB lost its case at the European 
Court of Justice in 2015, it has again given notice that it will be difficult for the UK to hang 
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on to its valuable euro-clearing business following Brexit. However, even if London loses its 
legal protection against the relocation of euro-related business, it is unlikely that such a 
relocation will occur any time soon because what ultimately matters for financial institutions 
of whatever nationality is the costs of doing financial business, and the cost advantages of 
London that are conferred by the sheer depth and liquidity of its financial markets are not 
likely to be matched by any other European financial centre in the immediate future for the 
reasons cited above.   
 
London as the Global Centre for Asset and Collateral Management 
The longevity of London’s reign as a premier centre for finance is in large part, due to its 
dynamism: major historical shifts within the global financial system were reflected in the 
shifts within the City.  Over the past three decades, two inter-related processes have defined 
the global economy: the transformation of the banking system (from the ‘originate to hold’ to 
the ‘originate and distribute’ model of banking) and the shift away from bank-dominated to 
market-based financial intermediation. In the run up to, but especially after, the 2007-09 
crisis, these two tendencies heralded the rise of global capital markets (as opposed to bank-
based finance) as major sources of funds. In what follows, this section explains why in the 
international capital markets, London’s global lead – just like in FX trade and cross-border 
lending - is due to the historical concentration of infrastructure, liquidity and skills, enabled 
and encouraged by targeted regulation and discriminatory niche policies.    
 Capital markets are markets for buying and selling financial instruments. Spanning 
many types of securities,
2
 capital markets tie together bank and non-bank financial 
intermediaries, providing funding and risk management services to a variety of firms, banks 
and other financial institutions. In this process, the activities of capital markets – including 
raising new capital and managing existing portfolios - link together asset managers and a 
wide range of other financial institutions, including commercial and universal banks, 
investment banks, trust companies, insurance companies, private banks, captive and 
independent pension fund managers, mutual fund companies, and various types of specialist 
firms (Walter 1999: 1-2).  
 Since the mid-1990s, asset management has been one of the most dynamic segments 
of the financial system, hang expanded from $30 trillion in 1997 (Walter 1999) to $71.4 
                                                          
2
 Principally, equity and debt. 
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trillion in 2016 (BCG 2016). Overall, during the post- WWII period, assets under 
management (AUM) have risen across most OECD countries; most prominently in the USA 
and, in a much shorter period of time, in the UK (Haldane 2014). On average the industry has 
been growing by 13% per year, and  despite having stalled at just over $71 trillion in 2016, is 
anticipated to expand further
3
  (BCG 2015; Credit Suisse 2015; IMF 2015).
4
 
 This expansion has been driven by demographic changes in the advanced economies 
and reforms of the pension systems, the trend towards greater diversification of portfolios, 
away from selections dominated by domestic assets and towards more cross-border, 
internationalised holdings of securities and the recent professionalisation of wealth 
management (Walter 1999; Harrington 2016).  Throughout history, these trends were 
uniquely accommodated by the deep and diverse pool of capital, technology and talent in the 
City of London, and have been further reinforced by post-2009  shifts in finance. Two 
specific mechanisms are key to understanding this process: liquidity and collateral 
management. 
 Raising capital, or funding, centers on the process known as liquidity transformation. 
It involves the provision to investors of liquid claims that are  typically backed by illiquid 
assets, and is a key function of many financial intermediaries. Historically, liquidity 
transformation has been primarily performed by banks, which would hold illiquid loans but 
give investors liquid deposits (Chernenko and Sunderam 2016: 1). However, even before the 
2007-09 crisis,  asset managers  provided similar services, partly by being able to create short 
term liquidity from illiquid assets by using them as collateral in capital market operations.   
Post-2009, in the wide range of  regulatory initiatives, it is Basle 3, aimed at raising capital 
and liquidity requirements for the banking sector, which has been the most consequential 
(Manna 2015).  Responding to Basle 3, banks and financial institutions had to minimise their 
reliance on unsecured finding and instead rely much more on collateralised transactions. This 
in turn, has made collateral management and the attendant capital market mechanisms that 
facilitate it, fundamental to the operation of the financial system and financial stability.  
 As a sub-set of wealth management sector, the asset management industry is 
dominated by three principal  types of professional managers of funds: mutual funds, pension 
funds, and private-client assets, as well as foundations, endowments, central bank reserves 
and other large financial pools requiring institutional asset management services, such as for 
                                                          
3
 Credit Suisse (2015) predicts that global AUM is set to grow by 40% in the next 5 years.  
4
 Haldane reports that in the United States, AUM have risen almost fivefold relative to GDP since 1946, from 
around 50% of GDP to around 240% of GDP. In the United Kingdom this pattern has been replicated, but over a 
much shorter time period, since around 1980 (Haldane 2014: 2-3). 
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instance, sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) (Walter 1999). Together, hedge funds, pension 
funds, insurance companies and alternative investors operating out of London control £4,230 
bn of assets (Burrows and Lowe 2015). At the same time, they are reported to have more £15 
trillion of assets under management (UKTI 2015: 8). This latter figure accounts for about a 
quarter of global assets managed professionally, currently estimated to be around $85 trillion 
(BCG 2015; IMF 2015) and makes London the second largest fund management market in 
the world (UKTI 2015).  In various international surveys, London tops the list of most 
desired destinations for fund management, ahead of Hong Kong, Singapore and New York. 
This unique niche is confirmed by the Global Financial Centres Index (Table 5). Globally, 
“the UK’s share of the global hedge fund industry more than doubled in the decade up to 
2011 to 18 per cent, when 85 per cent of European hedge fund assets were managed out of 
the UK” (UKTI 2013: 5).  
 
Insert Table 5 about here.  
 
Two specific mechanisms of capital markets – the market for repurchase operations 
(repos) and collateral management – help us understand why the concentration of liquidity, 
skills, informational and technological capital makes London so central for these two areas of 
capital management. Collateral and liquidity management  has been defined ‘as the optimal 
management of credit, collateral, capital and all related execution, pricing, operational, 
documentation, and risk management of a portfolio across all products, all business units, and 
all locations’ (Hill 2015: 6, Box 1).  Repo markets, best understood as markets for short-term 
secured loans, are essential to the efficient market funding and balance sheet management. 
The repo market (estimated European size is 6 trillion euros, compared with $10 trillion in 
the USA) is the lifeblood of modern capital markets.
5
 Although the complex network of repo 
transactions is dominated by banks, they form part of the larger collateral chain that ties 
together the banking sector, asset management, institutions typically associated with 
‘financial plumbing’,  as well as real economic assets. London is a premier global platform 
                                                          
5
 Repos, or securities financing transactions, involve a temporary loan of cash guaranteed by collateral.  Banks 
use the repo market in order to fund their balance sheets. They do this by borrowing cash from investor (e.g. 
money market funds), in exchange for pledging bonds and other securities as collateral. Repo contracts tend to 
be very short term in nature (overnight or a few days), hence the repo markets acts as the main place to source 
and mobilise collateral, also acting to link securities and derivatives markets. This makes repo market the 
primary source of inter-bank lending a vital node in the infrastructure of financial transactions and the fluidity of 
collateral (ICMA 2015; Singh 2010). 
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facilitating collateral management and capital market lending due to, first, existing economies 
of scale and scope, and second, as a result of nuanced and targeted regulatory provisions.  
With its developed network of relationships and wide scope for efficient international 
services, the City accommodates a great variety of capital raisers and securities dealers and is 
a crucial node in global capital market infrastructure.
6
 Today the UK is home to branches of 
all major global banks and several key clearing houses. Together, 15 global banks employ 
almost 70,000 people in London, with 5 largest US banks – Goldman Sachs, Bank of 
America Merrill Lynch, Citi, Morgan Stanley and JP Morgan – employing 30000 staff in 
London (Noonan 2016). And while London-specific data on repo transactions may suggest a 
relatively modest size of $800 billion (Manna 2016), the importance of repo and other types 
of securities financed transactions can be appreciated in the context of collateral 
management.   
 In the post-2009 regulatory context, collateral management has become inseparable 
from liquidity management and risk management for both the users and the facilitators of 
capital markets.
7
 As Hill puts it simply, collateral is the new cash (Hill 2015: 5). But it is not 
only due to post-2009 regulations that collateral services have grown in scope and 
importance. Professional investors, confronted with the yield problem in the context of low 
and negative interests rates, have come to rely on short-term capital market instruments in 
order to deliver the returns for clients whose assets they manage (Claessens et al 2012; 
Lysandrou 2012;  Lysandrou and Nesvetailova 2014; Lysandrou and Shabani 2016). The 
scarcity of high-quality collateral necessary to finance transactions in capital markets was 
first identified as a global problem in 2010 (Singh 2010), and it has continued to daunt 
markets and regulators since. Current estimates by the private sector put the need for high 
quality collateral between $1 - $2.5 trillion (Treasury Strategies 2015) whereas some 
regulators estimate it to be as high as $4 trillion (CGFS 2013).
8
  
It is beyond doubt that the existing scale and competitive advantages in banking-related 
related services help to account for London’s premier position as a global hub for collateral 
and liquidity management. London, with its developed banking network, advanced legal 
infrastructure with its historically close links to finance, as well as technological and human 
                                                          
6
 OFR researchers estimate the global market at about $3.4 trillion in repos (in which dealers sell securities and 
receive cash) and $2.4 trillion in reverse repos (in which dealers deliver cash and receive securities). 
7
 Collateral therefore, is an intrinsic feature of the modern financial system, whether securitizing loans, 
collateralizing repo transactions (including central bank money market operations), or margining OTC 
derivatives trades (Hill 2014). 
8
 CGFS, 2013, “Asset encumbrance, financial reform and the demand for collateral assets”, CGFS papers, No. 
49.  
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resources necessary for these activities, is a vital hub where collateral, liquidity and risk 
management network coincide to create a leading global centre for asset management 
(including collateral management): today ‘more assets are managed through London than any 
other place in Europe” (UKTI 2015: 5). The unique concentration of factors attracts overseas 
capital: 40 percent of the asset management firms in London are owned by overseas 
investors; more than a third of funds, or some £2.2 trillion, are held on behalf of overseas 
investors (UKTI 2015). According to the Bank of England, while the hedge funds captured 
by UK regulatory scope are managed from the United Kingdom, the funds themselves are 
typically domiciled overseas (Burrows and Low 2015: 123).   
  London’s deep, liquid money and capital markets, and the City’s historical position 
as leader in bank lending and the provision of  a variety of financial and legal services, 
primed it to accommodate the interests of a vast range of sovereign and corporate borrowers 
(Hill 2014: 5). These scale economies help explain why London has become the capital of the 
global M&A boom of the past few years, estimated at $4 trillion worth of deals in 2015. With 
global value of cross-border deals estimated at $1 trillion, London has been at the centre of 
the corridor between North American and Europe, where a third of cross-border M&A deals 
were registered (Deloitte 2015).  The unique concentration of financial, legal and accounting 
expertise in London explains its lead in the M&A sector, where transactions tend to be ‘large, 
cross-border and often high-profile’ (Massoudi 2015: 46).  
 Scale economies also help explain why London is an important centre in the 
management of sovereign wealth funds’ assets, as a clearing house and a location where a 
number of these funds are managed. A number of large Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) 
such as the Kuwait Investment Authority, Brunei Investment Agency, Abu Dhabi Investment 
Authority and Temasek/General Investment Corporation of Singapore have local 
representative offices in London.  The International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds, a 
group of 26 funds led by China, Russia and the Gulf States, has its Secretariat located in 
London (UKTI 2015: 19).  While the UK and US each accounted for around 16% of the $800 
billion invested by SWFs since 2007, in relation to the size of its economy, the UK attracted 
over five times more investment than the US. According to the report by the Sovereign 
Wealth Fund Institute, in 2014, global assets under management of SWFs increased by 16% 
to a record $7.1 trillion, with direct investments by SWFs amounting to $117 billion – the 
second highest annual amount invested on record (CityUK 2015).   
At the same time however, scale economies and the concentration of competitive 
advantage factors provide only a partial account of London’s continued global lead in 
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financial innovation and investment. Regulatory niche policies have been key to sustaining 
the exceptionally high volume of financial activity in London, particularly in the area of asset 
and collateral management.    
At first glance, compared with its major rival – New York’s Wall Street - London’s 
regulatory advantage is subtle. The UK has been subject to pan-European rules and 
regulations that traditionally are thought to be more restrictive than in the US (Posner and 
Veron 2010). Yet it is the exceptions to the European regulatory norms that continue to shape 
UK’s relationship with the EU regulators, and which constitute an important regulatory 
lacunae for the City of London. Post-2009, as the EU regulations tightened, the City of 
London sought to carve out exemptions from the post-crisis regulation of derivatives, hedge 
funds, and rating agencies that limited access of non-EU firms to capital markets, in order to 
preserve the role of London as the primary hub of non-EU firms in the European markets 
(Pagliari 2013).  While recent literature has mostly focused on the regulatory lacunae in the 
area of derivatives regulations (Quaglia 2007, 2015; Mugge 2014), the case of collateral 
rehypothecation  (colloquially known as collateral churning) is particularly significant in the 
post-2009 context and the rise of non-bank financial sectors.   
The UK rules that guide asset management operations are quite restrictive: prime 
brokers, for example, are prohibited from commingling their own funds with those of their 
clients when carrying out their daily operations. However, the UK regulations provide several 
key exceptions that allow brokers to avoid these prohibitions (Deryugina 2009: 268-69).  As 
a result of such exceptions, prime brokers customarily commingle client cash with their own 
funds; similarly, most hedge funds are allowed to commingle funds when operating on behalf 
of a professional client
9
 (Deryigina 2009: 270). Interestingly, while post-2009  there has been 
a tightening of regulatory rules around the ‘alternative investment’ industry, it is again, the 
exceptions that have helped London to maintain its global lead. Specifically, the post-2009 
restrictions  on collateral re-hypothecation limit its applicability to the 20 or so global 
investment firms (e.g., international investment banks and prime brokers) for which it is 
assumed to be operationally more risky to segregate client monies on receipt, given the range 
of jurisdictions and time zones involved (Thiede 2015).  Quite literally, therefore, the scale 
                                                          
9
 As Deryugina (2009 explains), hedge funds frequently give custody of their assets to large investment banks 
that provide prime brokerage services. These large investment banking institutions—the prime brokers—
administer the daily business affairs of the hedge funds. Where permitted by law, prime brokers utilise the assets 
of the hedge funds to execute lending and borrowing transactions such as rehypothecation (Deryugina 2009 : 
255-56).  
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economies typically associated with large financial entities allow them to capitalise on crucial 
exceptions in the new regulatory requirements.  
Data on the amount of collateral being re-pledged and re-hypothecated is notoriously 
difficult to obtain. Illustrating the scale of the challenge, as well as regulatory concerns about 
collateral re-use, in February 2016 the FSB launched an open consultation on the 
methodologies for evaluating the amount of collateral being re-cycled through the system 
(FSB 2016). Nevertheless, we can infer from the available global data on collateral re-use just 
how central London is for collateral management. According to ISDA, in 2014 cash 
comprised over 90% of collateral eligible for rehypothecation and more than 80% of 
collateral actually rehypothecated. Government securities accounted for the second most used 
asset class, followed by ‘other securities’ (ISDA 2015). Given that London is the largest 
global hub for FX markets  as well as derivatives trades, it is reasonable to conclude that,  
targeted regulatory niche policies have cemented London’s premiership in asset management 
generally and collateral management specifically.  
Furthermore, in 2011-13, the UK government specifically targeted the asset 
management sector by offering a set of regulatory exceptions. In addition to no limits on  
collateral rehypothecation
10
 (compared with a far more restrictive limit of 140%  in USA), 
these regulatory niches include: fifty percent reduction in time for the FCA authorisation of a 
new fund; passport benefits (under EU rules, fund managers can register funds in one 
Member State and then freely market them across the whole of the EU);  some 120 double 
taxation agreements, which can benefit funds domiciled in the UK and, perhaps most 
crucially, which include a range of tax exceptions for fund managers that are aimed to make 
UK more competitive than Ireland and even Luxemburg (UKTI 2013).   
  Just as in international bank lending and in the FX and OTC derivatives markets 
therefore, in the global capital markets, London has managed to fuse together the classical 
advantages of scale economies and targeted discriminatory practices.  On the one hand, 
London’s history as a global financial centre means that any firm operating out of London 
can benefit from the available efficiencies and scale economies, now multiplied across the 
sectors that comprise and service the finance industry.  On the other hand, in the era of asset 
management and the post-2009 period of collateralised lending, London has  reinforced these 
traditional sets of economic advantages by targeted policies and regulatory niche initiatives.    
  
                                                          
10
 Re-hypothecation (often used interchangeably with ‘re-use’ and ‘re-pledge’) refers to re-use of securities 
posted as collateral, in other transactions.    
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Conclusion 
In the framework of classical theories of financial centres, London’s success as a premier 
global financial hub is an anomaly. The size of the UK economy is disproportionally small 
compared to the size of the UK financial sector, and traditional economic arguments cannot 
explain the ascent of London as a global financial centre. At the same time, London is not a 
typical offshore financial centre (OFC) either: unlike booking or registration havens, London 
is home to a wide range of financial, clearing, capital raising and risks management activities 
undertaken by bank and non-bank financial institutional on behalf of a wide range of UK, 
European  and overseas clients.  
 Having analysed the area of cross-border bank lending, FX and derivatives trade and 
the asset management industry, we have argued that London’s success as a financial centre is 
neither due exclusively to scale economies factors, nor to discriminatory practices. Rather, a 
combination of conditions that are unique to London help explain why it has been able to 
draw on both economic and regulatory factors to bolster its success.  
 As a declining traditional Marshallian financial district, London benefitted 
enormously from the rise of the Euromarkets on the back of audacious discriminatory 
practices. The expanding Euromarkets sustained a return to scale economies, which, 
combined with London’s reputation for permissive regulatory environment, placed London as 
the leading centre in the fledgling FX swap market. For similar reasons, and considering 
subtle discriminatory practices accepted in London, combined with its deep liquidity as a 
large whole-scale financial centre, London is also a leading centre for the asset management 
industry.  Up to now, no other financial centre in the world has managed to capitalise on the 
competitive advantages arising from the economies of scale, and on subtle regulatory 
discrimination in quite the same way. 
 At the time of writing, it is far too premature to project the effects of Brexit on the 
position of London in the global financial topography. At the heart of any development will 
be the risks of Brexit to London’s scale economies, and the opportunities for further 
regulatory exceptions afforded by the departure from EU.  Ultimately though, this centres on 
the conflict between regulatory issues on the one side and liquidity issues on the other. The 
moves by EU elites to relocate euro trading back to the continent will undermine the liquidity 
and efficiency of London’s markets. Yet it is unlikely that such a relocation will occur any 
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time soon: the cost advantages of London that are conferred by the sheer depth and liquidity 
of its financial markets are not likely to be matched by any other European financial centre in 
the immediate future.    
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TABLES AND GRAPHS 
 
Table 1    International Financial Centers, 2006 
External positions of banks in all currencies vis-à-vis all sectors 
   
Reporting Countries  Amounts outstanding 
                                             Claims               liabilities        combined     % share of total 
      
All countries                          26,094.4           24,175.0         50,269     
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1.  UK   5,178.5            5,432.1           10,611            21.10% 
2.         US   2,305.1            2,819.1            5124              10.19% 
3.         Germany  2,794                1,722.0              4516                 9.0% 
4.         France   2,196.1        2,122.0                 4318               8.9 
5. Caymans  1661.9          1620.0               3282                 6,52 
6. Japan   1,898.5         681.7                  2580                5,13 
7.         Switzerland  1,122.0          1001.0              2123                  4,22 
8.         Netherlands  1041.5           943.0                1984                  3,94 
9 Belgium  819.1              889.5                1698                3.37 
`10. Ireland   891.6              753.9                1645                 3,27 
11. Luxembourg  901.1             607.0                 1508                2.99 
12. Singapore  603.5              606.5               1210                2,40 
13. Italy   497.5              677.5                1175               2.33 
14.       Hong Kong SAR  449.9              526.0               976                < 2.0% 
15       Spain               621.4            352.8                 974                < 2.0% 
16       Jersey   444.1              309.4                 751                <2.0%            
17.       Bahamas  343.3               347.4                  691              <2.0 % 
18.       Austria                        360.8               277.1                  638              < 2. 0% 
19        Sweden  52.7              328.5                581                    < 2.0 % 
20.       Australia                       146.8             380.2                527                <2.0 % 
21.       Canada                242.0             208.7                451               < 1.0% 
22.       Denmark                       161.9           241.5                   403                 <1.0 % 
23.       Guernsey  183.0              155.4                  338                  <1.0% 
24.       Bahrain  159.7             153.3                   313                 <1.0% 
25.      Finland                           83.4             101.9                  185                   <1.0% 
26.      Norway                          57.7            125.1                    183                   <1.0% 
27.      Isle of Man    77.0               51.7                   129                    <1.0% 
 
 
 Source: BIS 2006 
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Table 2 International Financial Centers, 2006 
 
                                                 COMBINED                  % OF TOAL 
ALL COUNTRIES                          50,269   
 
British Empire                          18,301                                              36.40 
(Figures for the British Empire include the UK, Caymans, Singapore, Hong Kong, 
Bahamas, Jersey, Guernsey, Isle of Man) 
British State              15,111                                           30.06 
(UK, Caymans, Jersey, Guernsey, Isle of Man) 
US                  5124                                             14.9 
 
Source: BIS 2006 
  
32 
 
Table 3    International Financial Centers, 2015 
Cross-border positions, by location of reporting bank and sector of counterparty 
   
Reporting Countries  Amounts outstanding 
                                              Claims               liabilities        combined     % share of total 
      
All countries                          27,365.0           24,140.5           51,505 
 
1.  UK   4,491.5             3,815.3   8,306                    16.12 
2.         US   3,118.0             4,026.2              7,144                    13.87   
3. France   2,205.2             2,184.2               4389                     8.52 
4.         Japan   3,125.2             1,205.1               4330                      8.40 
5. Germany  2,254.0             1,709.3               3,963                     7.69 
6. Caymans  1,299.9             1,310.0                  2540                      4.93 
7.         Hong Kong SAR 1,272,7             1,019.8            2293                     4,45 
8.         Netherlands  1,125.6                945.8                2071                     4.40 
9 Switzerland     863.0                828.5               1688                      3.27 
10. Singapore     723.4                707.5              1430                   < 3.0 % 
11. Belgium     626.5                516.6              1143                    < 3.0 % 
12.   Australia                      444.7                679.2              1124                   < 3.0 % 
13.  Luxembourg    661.5                 434.8              1096                   < 3.0 % 
14.  Italy     473.7                 477.4              951                     <2.0 % 
15      Canada                461.9                 391.9              854            <2.0 % 
16       Spain     423.9                 353.5               777                      <2.0 % 
17.       Finland                          320.3                 405.9              725                       <2.0 % 
18.       Sweden    445.3                 267.0                 712                     <2.0 % 
19.       Ireland     323.2                 300.0              623                      <2.0 % 
20.       Chinese Taipei              359.8                 199.7              560                  <2.0 % 
21.       Korea                            223.9                 255.4              479                 <1.0% 
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22.       Austria                         277.8                   180.6               459                   <1.0% 
 
23.       Denmark                      227.5                183.3                 410                        <1.0% 
24.       Norway                        178.0                222.7              401                        <1.0% 
25.      Bahamas   169.4                194.0              363                       <1.0% 
26.      Jersey                          181.5                126.6               308                      <1.0% 
27.       Bahrain   138.6                137.3                276                    <1.0% 
28.       Guernsey              150.9                  97.6                 249                     <1.0% 
Macao SAR                             112.7                  82.9                196                          <1.0% 
Isle of Man                57.9                   45.1                  103                       <1.0% 
Cyprus                                      31.7                   30.1                 62                         <1.0% 
     
 
BIS 2015  
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Table 4 International Financial Centers, 2015 
 
                                                 COMBINED                  % OF TOAL 
ALL COUNTRIES                        51,505 
 
British Empire                 15,654 (18,311)              30.39% (36.40%) 
(Figures for the British Empire include the UK, Caymans, Singapore, Hong Kong, 
Bahamas, Jersey, Guernsey, Isle of Man) 
British State             11,506 ( 15,111)                                 22.33%    (30.06% ) 
(UK, Caymans, Jersey, Guernsey, Isle of Man) 
US                  5124                                             14.9 
 
Source: BIS 2006 
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Table 5. Most attractive centres for relocating/expanding asset management operations  
Raking  Location  Score  
1 London 75 
2 Hong Kong  52 
3 Singapore  33 
4 New York 18 
5 Sao Paulo 10 
6= Moscow  7 
6= Paris 7 
8 Luxemburg 6 
9 Geneva 5 
10= Helsinki 4 
10= Shanghai  4 
10= Zurich 4 
Source: UKTI 2013: 7.  
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1
 Interestingly, Park pays little attention to mid-size European financial centers for the simple 
reason that they had not developed as yet as a distinct group. Reed identified in 1981 only 
Amsterdam and Zurich among what he described as third tier financial centers. See Reed 
1981. Reed’s study covered a sample of 80 financial centers. He considered London at the 
very top, New York and Tokyo at level two, Amsterdam, Chicago, Frankfurt, Hamburg, 
Hong Kong, Paris, San Fransico and Zurich at level three.   
 
